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Introduction 
Recent months have seen a reintensification of concern within 
Scotland over the future of steel-making at British Steel's Ravenscraig 
complex. This concern is intimately linked with the privatisation of British 
Steel (BS). For most of the 1980s BS has been charged with the 
responsibility of preparing the industry for privatisation and in December 
1987 Kenneth Clarke, the Secretary of State at the Department of Trade 
and Industry, indicated that the company was to the fore of the 
Government's privatisation programme. Following the July 1988 
announcement of a strong financial performance for the trading year 1987/ 
88, flotation was scheduled for November 1988. 
The principal purpose here is to set out the most likely consequences of 
this privatisation for Ravenscraig. When he announced in December 1987 
the intention to privatise BS, Kenneth Clarke indicated that the company 
would be privatised as a single entity and made a number of references to 
the position of the Ravenscraig complex. Specifically he pointed out that, 
subject to market conditions: the hot strip mill at Ravenscraig would 
continue in operation at least until 1989; Ravenscraig's iron and steel-
making facilities will continue to operate for at least seven years; and there 
will be a requirement over a similar period into the 1990s for the output of 
the Dalzell plate mill adjacent to the Ravenscraig complex. In July 1988 the 
present Chairman of BS, Mr Robert Scholey, suggested that there might be 
little case for the retention of the hot strip mill beyond 1989. Before turning 
directly to such matters, however, it is important to outline the various 
stages of the steel-making process and the role of Scottish output within 
BS's activities. This will allow an informed discussion of BS's current 
production configuration and facilitate an explanation of why the plant is 
seriously threatened by the Corporation's investment plans. The argument 
is that BS can reduce the number of sites at which it operates, maintain 
production and increase profitability. In our view, this will prove attractive 
to private shareholders who can increase returns through elimination of the 
marginal plant at Motherwell. We conclude that, given present strategies, 
Ravenscraig has no future within BS. We set out details of a new technique 
which potentially affords a future for the works. We do not share the 
emerging view that large plant closures can easily be accommodated. 
Without minimizing the difficulties, we support the view that investments 
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in this technique should be pressed on both BS and its future owners. In our 
estimation this remains the best strategy for North Lanarkshire. 
The Production Processes of the Steel Industry 
Steelmaking is an energy-intensive process in which iron ore is refined 
in a series of furnaces in order to produce a molten liquid of precise 
chemical composition and physical properties. The hot metal is then cast 
into semi-finished shapes which are rolled into a variety of final products 
(eg rails, rods, bars, sheets and plates). The production process presents 
five main stages each of which exhibit scale economies which are not 
exhausted by the largest plants so far constructed. 
The first stage, iron-making, involves the removal of oxygen and other 
impurities from iron ore. In all BS plants the inputs to the process are 
prepared or produced on site. Coke is baked from metallurgical coal in 
batteries of coke-ovens and iron ore of different grades are mixed to allow 
the use of cheaper, less pure ores. In addition, finer grades of ore are 
agglomerated in a process known as sintering. A burden or charge of coke, 
ore and sinter is placed in the blast furnace and hot air is blown through. 
This causes the coke to bum, melting the ore and removing the unwanted 
oxygen as carbon dioxide. The molten iron is tapped into vessels and other 
impurities are separated off as a slag. At this stage the metal is over 90 
percent pure iron and the molten liquid is transferred to a steel furnace for 
further refinement. 
Within BS, the steelmaking stage is almost exclusively undertaken in 
Basic Oxygen Furnaces (BOF). The charge consists of a mixture of scrap 
and molten iron with small amounts of lime added to facilitate the removal 
of impurities. Oxygen is blown through the charge and carbon is removed 
as carbon monoxide gas. The process is precisely controlled to yield steel of 
the desired composition. It is increasingly common to further refine steel in 
secondary steelmaking vessels to generate higher quality output with more 
exacting mechanical and physical properties. 
These major stages exhibit economies of scale. Aylen<1l estimates that 
the minimum efficient scale (MES) of operation of a blast furnace is 4 
million tonnes per annum whilst for a BOF plant two 340 tonne vessels 
provide the optimum low cost unit. Capacity which is smaller results in 
significant cost penalties per tonne of output. BS presently operates eleven 
blast-furnaces, three of which are MES plants whilst only three of its five 
steelmaking plants approach the optimal capacity. All of BS's Scottish 
plant is significantly smaller than the MES and is regarded as a relatively 
high cost operation. 
The third stage in the production process is the casting of molten steel 
into semi-finished shapes suitable for rolling into finished product. The 
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traditional method involves pouring liquid steel into moulds. The resulting 
ingot is allowed to cool, the mould removed and the ingot reheated and 
rolled in a primary mill into the desired type of "semi". This procedure has 
been progressively replaced by the more efficient continuous casting 
process which generates "semi's" directly from molten liquid. The 
"concast" route has three distinct benefits: it improves product yield by 
eliminating the scrap which results from cropping the ingot in the 
traditional route; it reduces energy consumption by eradicating the need to 
reheat inputs and power a primary mill; and the concast product is of 
significantly higher quality than ingot steel. By European and Japanese 
standards BS has been relatively slow to adopt concast, although its 
investment intentions in the immediate future will result in over 85 percent 
of its product deriving from the concast route. 
The fourth stage in the process is hot rolling. Flat products such as 
plate and strip are rolled from semi-finished shapes called slabs whilst long 
products such as rails and sections are derived from blooms. A slab has a 
rectangular cross-section while a bloom has a square cross-section. In both 
cases the semi-finished feedstock is passed through a series of rollers until 
the desired shape is obtained. Long products are often sold to consumers 
with no further processing although flat products are finished in a variety of 
ways. Plates are often heat-treated to install the desired mechanical 
properties whilst hot strip can be both cold rolled to improve surface quality 
and coated with materials such as tin, zinc and plastic. Since the closure of 
the Gartcosh cold rolling mill, Scottish hot strip output requires to be 
transported to Wales where all of BS's finishin~ mills are located. Again, 
scale economies exist in rolling mills and Aylen 2) estimates that only BS's 
two Welsh strip mills approach the optimal scale. In addition, both of BS's 
remaining plate mills at Dalzell and Scunthorpe are small and under-
powered and present cost penalties compared with larger units. 
In Scotland Ravenscraig produces slabs and hot strip. Both of these are 
intermediate products which require further processing. Dalzell produces 
plates of high quality and tolerances, eg armour plates, submarine hulls, 
plates for construction of high pressure boilers and plates for offshore 
applications. At present, as may be seen from Table 1, 20 percent of 
Ravenscraig's output goes to Dalzell. Around 35 percent of Ravenscraig's 
TABLE 1 
Current Disposition ofRavenscraig's Output (000 tonnes) 




HRC Exports 200 
TotalOuput 2000 
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output goes to Shotton, its single most important consumer, for further 
processing. Remaining output is disposed as exports slabs (15 percent), 
tinplate (20 percent) and hot rolled coil exports (10 percent). 
The Evolution ofBS's Productive Capacity 
Following nationalization in 1967, the Steel Corporation operated all 
the major production processes at twenty-one sites. In addition to those 
integrated plants, the Corporation engaged in steelmaking at sixteen other 
locations, twelve of which possessed rolling mills. Rolling and finishing 
were undertaken at a further dozen locations. Much of this capacity 
employed obsolete production methods and was extremely small scale 
relative to the optimal plant size for the respective technology. 
Following the Benson Report, it was widely believed that, because of 
scale economies, the UK industry required to concentrate production at a 
small number of large scale plants. Indeed, nationalization was regarded in 
many quarters as a necessary step to attaining this objective because the 
segmented ownership and poor performance of the private sector acted as a 
constraint upon the adjustment process. The model for the industry was the 
large scale coastal sites in Japan. A corporate strategy was thrashed out by 
BS executives, steel consultants and civil servants which envisaged that the 
Corporation would have 36 million tonnes of liquid steelmaking capacity by 
the early 1980s concentrated at five or six major plants all at coastal 
locations. This plan was fully set out in the Ten Year Development Strategy 
published by Government in 1973. 
In the first instance, major investments were to be undertaken at the 
two Welsh strip plants at Port Talbot and Llanwern in South Wales, and at 
the long product sites at Redcar and Scunthorpe. The programme 
anticipated major increases in capacity at these plants which would be 
utilized fully through closure and withdrawal from sub-optimal locations. 
In Scotland the situation was a little different. Ravenscraig was to be 
expanded marginally and completely modernized with improvements 
made at all stages of the production process. However, it remained a 
smaller plant than the English and Welsh operations because it was 
regarded as a staging post for a 6-7 million tonnes per annum plant at 
Hunters ton based on the Direct Reduction-Electric Arc steelmaking route. 
The first Opec oil shock depressed the world economy in the mid 
1970s. Steelmakers were simultaneously faced with falling demand, rising 
input prices and higher cost of capital. The Corporation's costs in this 
period rose particularly sharply because they were prevented from closing 
many of their smaller plants for social reasons. Market conditions 
continued to deteriorate as much of the Corporation's modern capacity 
came on stream and world-wide capacity rose as a result of expansion plans 
in Less Developed Countries (LDC's) and other countries. In 1979, BS 
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were forced to retrench further by closing relatively modern works as at 
Consett, Shotton and Corby. The strategy became one of loading up their 
five Heritage plants and thereby attempting to reduce average costs. In 
addition, they embarked on Project Slimline which involved major changes 
in working practices and renumeration. Surviving works were eventually to 
be demanned in order to increase labour productivity whilst a greater 
element of earnings was in the form of a lump sum bonus linked to 
performance. 
As early as 1980, however, following the second Opec oil shock, the 
Corporation were considering still further rationalization. The 1980/81 
Corporate plan, projected likely demand and concluded that on the basis of 
pessimistic scenarios, savings could be made only by further concentration 
of activity. It is interesting to note that, given the total upgrading of 
Ravenscraig which took place during the 1970s, the option of closing the 
complex was not at the centre of the Corporation's thinking. The most 
likely option for strip products appeared to be mothballing of Llanwern's 
steelmaking and Port Talbot's rolling mills. In the event these options were 
not pursued in Wales but the position of the Scottish industry altered 
dramatically during the 1980s. 
The shift in attitude towards Ravenscraig emerged from two sets of 
considerations: first, against a background of considerable world-wide 
excess steel capacity, the Corporation foresaw substantial difficulties in 
securing good margin business in highly competitive non-EEC markets and 
was constrained within Europe by adverse currency levels and by the 
Davignon quota arrangements designed to restore balance between 
European output and demand; secondly, the Corporation's strategic 
thinking shifted towards identification of Ravenscraig as the marginal plant 
among the five remaining integrated steelworks. This latter consideration 
was based essentially on a comparison between the attributes of the 
Corporation's operations in Scotland and in South Wales. 
Locational and site-specific factors played a central role in determining 
the Corporation's outlook. Located inland from the ore terminal at 
Hunterston, Ravenscraig clearly did not, unlike Port Talbot, fit the "ideal" 
model of a coastal plant. Port Talbot's larger plant also presented the 
potential for the realisation of scale economies. Llanwern had the 
advantage over Ravenscraig of a well laid out site. Perhaps the most widely-
discussed rationale for regarding Ravenscraig as the marginal plant lay, 
however, in the observation that Ravenscraig was more remote than the 
Welsh plants from final consumers. The decline of metal-using industries in 
Scotland imposed a cost disadvantage relative to the plants in terms of the 
higher transport costs involved in marketing Ravenscraig's output. 
Concern that the shift in attitude towards Ravenscraig would result in 
attempts by Sir Ian MacGregor to close the plant precipitated a campaign of 
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resistance within Scotland. This campaign was based on social and regional 
considerations and on the argument advanced primarily by Strathclyde 
Regional Council, that the Corporation was incorrect in its assessment that 
likely steel demand was inefficient to sustain five integrated plants. These 
efforts had a particularly successful conclusion. In 1982, following strong 
Scottish Office pressure, the Department of Trade and Industry prevented 
BS from commencing upon closure moves. 
Thereafter, perhaps partly for tactical (political) reasons and partly 
because of some increase in UK steel consumption during 1983-84, the 
Corporation shifted away from seeking a complete and abrupt closure of an 
integrated plant and towards the idea of a phased contraction. In 1984, the 
then Corporation Chairman, Sir Robert Haslam, discussed the closure of 
an integrated plant in frank terms by indicating to the Trade and Industry 
Select Committee that: 
"Our view would be that any closure would be phased and hence an 
immediate closure would be unlikely"(Cmnd 344 p.57). 
The subsequent closure of the Gartcosh cold-rolling mill in 1986 
should be viewed as representing one of those phases. That closure was 
consistent with the Corporation's oft-repeated argument that the 
objectives of commercial viability and privatisation are inconsistent with a 
five-plant configuration. Announcement of the Gartcosh closure made the 
Corporation eligible for State aid as part of the Community's capacity 
reduction and restructuring provisions. Simultaneously, the Corporation 
purchased and closed the privately-owned company Alphasteel and set 
about refurbishing Alphasteel's continuous casting facilities for installation 
at Llanwern as part of a massive programme of upgrading the Welsh plants. 
Two important elements emerged from the Gartcosh closure. First, 
with the explicit support of Government Ministers, social and regional 
considerations were firmly relegated to a minor role with the Corporation's 
thinking being driven primarily by the need to enhance commercial 
viability. Secondly, the locational savings derived from closing Gartcosh 
were minimal suggesting that the bulk of costs continued to rest with the 
main Ravenscraig complex. 
British Steel: The Current Situation 
British Steel faces a difficult environment because of adverse long run 
trends in world capacity. In particular, it is faced with excess capacity for 
key products in its home market in Europe. This has prompted BS 
Chairman, Sir Robert Scholey, to openly speculate as to whether the 
company will require only three integrated plants by the mid 1990s. 
LDC's share of steel production continues to grow faster than real 
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consumption. Much of this is state-owned and constitutes a key element in 
overall development strategies. There is continuing protection of major 
markets, notably the EEC and USA. The net effect of this has been to 
restrict access to profitable US and EEC business for many steelmakers. 
Production has been diverted to third markets causing prices to be weak. In 
addition, European producers have found their restricted access to US 
markets progressively less lucrative in recent years owing to the strength of 
European currencies against the dollar. This is partially offset by lower 
domestic prices for essential inputs such as coal, oil and ore which are 
denominated in dollars. Because Continental producers export greater 
proportions of production to North America than BS, their profitability has 
been restricted to a more significant extent. However, BS, which exports 
40% percent of its finished product has great difficulty finding good margin 
business in non-EEC markets. Until the uncertainty surrounding the dollar 
is settled and until the US protective regime is dismantled, it is likely that 
the EEC will remain the only market where BS can consistently generate 
reasonable margins on its export volumes. 
In the Community the apparatus constructed following the declaration 
of manifest crisis in 1980 has been dismantled for most major products. 
After failure to generate voluntary capacity reductions, the Commission 
liberalized the strip products market in July 1987. Thus, the situation in 
Europe is now one of a free market in which operating subsidies and 
investment aid are strictly prohibited. Since the mid-1970s, BS has 
progressively increased the share of its turnover derived from Community 
markets. In recent years, the weakness of the pound against the key 
currency, the Deutschmark (DM) has significantly enhanced the 
Corporation's profitability. Recent City estimates suggest that a 5 percent 
adverse movement of Sterling against the Mark will lead to a £120m 
reduction in BS profits. 
In addition to this currency advantage, BS has emerged as the world's 
lowest cost steel producer. This is the direct result of rationalization of 
capacity, investment programmes and manpower policies of the early 
1980s. At present BS is one of the Community's few profitable steel 
producers and one would be tempted to conclude that BS's European 
market share will inevitably increase further through the ability to undercut 
the prices of EEC rivals thus contributing to the enforced exit of loss-
making firms. However, three constraints can be identified which will limit 
such advances. First, the distribution channels on the continent are 
dominated by the producers. In France and Germany, 56 percent and 75 
percent of stockholding activity is controlled by steelmakers. This contrasts 
with the UK situation where the British Steel Service Centres account for 
less than 20 percent of the stockholding market. In recent years, BS has 
sought to remedy this position through acquisition of Continental stockists 
and re-rollers and would not be adverse to acquiring a European 
steelmaker to further enhance market access. Secondly, there is a 
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considerable degree of state involvement in the affairs of Community 
steelmakers. In both France and Italy, the steel industry is state-owned 
whilst the Dutch hold a golden share in Hoogovens. In Germany, the 
financial institutions own and control both steelmakers and major steel 
consumers. These factors restrict the ability of BS to expand in Europe 
through acquisition. Thirdly, because of the size of modern steel plants, 
they are often dominant employers in local economies. Indeed, since 1986, 
the EEC has been engaged in supra national negotiations designed to effect 
capacity reductions. The failure to achieve these aims largely reflects the 
reluctance of Government to face the social and political consequences of 
steel closures. 
The ability of BS to capitalize on its cost and currency advantages is, 
thus, limited and the elimination of unprofitable excess capacity is likely to 
be slow. As Aylen(3l has pointed out, the immediate tactics are likely to 
involve joint production arrangements rather than merger and acquisition. 
Whilst such actions will contribute towards eliminating excess supply, 
contraction has to be negotiated which implies a less favourable outcome 
for BS than that which would emerge if the market for corporate control 
was more competitive. Therefore, although BS can look forward to a 
successful future in Europe, uncertainty concerning excess capacity and 
currency levels allied to the bleak outlook in third markets prompts senior 
executives to question both whether present high production levels will 
endure and whether activity at all five integrated plants can be profitably 
sustained. 
On top of this long run contractionary pressure there are more 
immediate reasons to suspect that BS will withdraw from one or more of its 
present locations. First, all major forecasting agencies are predicting 
downturns in steel production in the first part of the next decade. Indeed, 
BS's own stockbroker, Philips and Drew has recently estimated that world 
steel demand will decline by 5 percent in 1990 and will not again reach 
current levels until the middle of the decade. In this analysis, EEC demand 
fares slightly better and it should be appreciated that BS is relatively well 
placed to weather a downturn in the cycle. However, such considerations 
rightly provoke concern about the marginal plant at Motherwell reinforced 
by the conclusions of the review of the Scottish steel industry undertaken 
for Motherwell District Council by Arthur Young.<4l This study draws 
attention to the plant configuration within BS and re-emphasizes the fact 
that, at all integrated sites, the Corporation's has iron and steelmaking 
capacity in excess of its casting and rolling capacity. 
The exact situation has been fully set out in the papers submitted to 
Arthur Young by Dunbar and Associates, the steel consultants led by 
Jimmy Dunbar, the former Works Director at Ravenscraig. This analysis 
demonstrates that both Port Talbot and Ravenscraig are constrained by 
concast bottlenecks and that both have iron and steelmaking capacity which 
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cannot be fully utilized. At Redcar, there is insufficient iron making 
capacity to fully utilize the downstream production capacity. Both 
Llanwern and Scunthorpe could increase output by bringing onstream idle 
blast furnaces. However, Llanwern is constrained by having a large 
proportion of its throughput processed by the ingot casting route. This not 
only results in cost penalties but generates output which is increasingly 
difficult to market profitably because of quality considerations. At 
Scunthorpe, the considerable iron and steelmaking facilities cannot be fully 
utilized because of both insufficient rolling mill capacity, a concast 
bottleneck and a low level of demand for the product range. 
It should be appreciated that these bottlenecks effectively arise owing 
to the haphazard retreat from the scale of operation envisaged by the 1973 
Development Strategy. The constraints, if removed, would allow a higher 
scale of activity and consequent reduction of average costs. The Arthur 
Young report made particular reference to the situation existing in BS's 
Strip Product Division and the plate making configuration evident within 
General Steels. The study basically concludes that it would be possible to 
eliminate the requirement for Ravenscraig's output by removing 
constraints at the two Welsh plants. This would mean no net loss of 
production potential and would lead to an annual increase in profitability of 
£100m at current levels of activity. 
As indicated earlier, BS require to rationalise their plate making 
activity. It is possible that such a development could take place in Scotland 
although it would be costly to undertake this expansion at Motherwell. 
Given the situation at Scunthorpe, Arthur Young and most other analysts 
argue that BS's most profitable course is to proceed with any proposed 
single plate mill development at this site. However, such conclusions 
should not prevent the Scottish Lobby from pressing BS on this matter. The 
timing of plate mill rationalization, like the timescale of retreat from 
Motherwell, is uncertain. Although the Arthur Young study provides a 
timetable, its critics should note that this is illustrative rather than 
definitive. 
EEC stipulations dictate that investment expenditure must be 
financed from commercial borrowing or cash flow. Thus the timing of all 
such output enhancing and cost reducing expenditures depends on the level 
of profitability which governs both possibilities. This in turn is a function of 
the market conditions which BS will face over the coming period. Indeed 
Bell et al<5l have surveyed major Scottish plate consumers and conclude 
that the likely level of North Sea activity will contribute to a continued 
buoyant demand for Dalzell plate. Given that Dalzell presents locational 
advantages with respect to many of its customers, this suggests that its 
future is indeed secure until well into the next decade. However, this study 
affords no conclusions and thus no comfort for the HSM whose closure BS 
estimate would save £15m per annum in operating costs. 
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The only possible conclusion from this analysis is that Ravenscraig 
faces a serious threat to its survival. This emanates from the external 
environment and the internal configuration of capacity. Thus, although it is 
demonstrably profitable, given current conditions, to operate on the basis 
of five integrated plants, it is more profitable to reduce the number of sites. 
In addition, because of the capacity enhancing nature of certain investment 
expenditure, this will not necessarily lead to the adverse effects on trade 
alluded to in certain quarters. 
The Effects of Privatisation 
Privatisation can be viewed to consist of two elements, the transfer of 
ownership and the liberalization of product and capital markets for the 
business in question. As has been pointed out above, the latter is not within 
the UK Government's control given that BS's home market should be 
properly regarded as the EEC block. Thus privatisation ofBS, whilst it may 
lead to a more credible platform from which to urge removal of the barriers 
to rationalization within the Community, is merely a transference of 
ownership from state to private individuals, employees and financial 
institutions. The Government has retained a golden share which previous 
experience suggests will be used sparingly, if at all. 
Our view, expressed over the last two years in the Fraser Institute 
Quarterly Commentary, is that an early flotation would seriously 
undermine the security of the Ravenscraig plant. The optimal outcome for 
Scottish interests would have been for the present owners, the State, to 
instruct BS management to prepare for flotation on the basis that they are 
required to build up profitable activity to a level which secures the future of 
the Motherwell plant. The guarantees given by BS and Trade Ministers fall 
far short of this. Indeed, recent statements by Sir Robert Scholey give 
further credence to the Arthur Young analysis. It would not be unfair to 
suggest that the Arthur Young scenario is that favoured by senior BS 
executives and that early flotation will be viewed by them as legitimization 
of this strategy. 
Indeed, the guarantees provided by BS and Government for the 
Motherwell Works should be assessed rather carefully. During the process 
of preparing for flotation, a company requires to provide much information 
in order to allow investors to gauge future direction and calculate a market 
price with which to compare with the offer for sale. The bulk of this 
information can be provided to analysts via company visits, published 
reports and accounts and special documentation. Steel is historically a 
cyclical industry and one important signal which requires to be made is how 
management will react to declining earnings during a downturn. In this 
respect the Motherwell guarantees demonstrate that a feasible 
retrenchment strategy is available to offer some support to bottom line 
profits if the trading environment does deteriorate as certain major 
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forecasters expect. In this view, the guarantees are directed towards 
comforting financial institutions rather than Lanarkshire workers. This is 
because the guarantees signal the likely timescale required for locational 
contraction whilst minimising the disruption to steel consumers. The 
qualification that the guarantees are subject to market considerations 
provides considerable flexibility and in the final analysis give BS carte 
blanche to dispose of their Scottish operation as they see fit. 
In numerous press interviews, Sir Robert Scholey has forcibly spelt out 
that he intends to be a profit maximizer as opposed to an output maximizer. 
He has publicly welcomed the privatisation as a measure which facilitates a 
thorough review of site policy because it frees management to make 
decisions on commercial grounds without the need to heed wider political 
pressure. He is signalling to potential shareholders that his leadership will 
be robust in defence of the interests of the new owners. The bullish stance 
over the future of the Ravenscraig strip mill is part of this process. Given 
the benefits of contraction identified by Arthur Young, Scholey is giving 
every indication that he will sacrifice his Scottish capacity, if and when it is 
in the best interests of his shareholders to do so. 
Scottish Steel- The Way Ahead 
There is every indication that phased withdrawal from Motherwell is 
the scenario most likely to unfold over the next five years. The timing of 
each phase will depend on the commercial judgement of BS. However, 
abstracting from the evolution of the trading environment, there is an 
internal dynamic within the Co~oration which appears loaded against the 
Motherwell plant. The STUC( l has recently identified and costed the 
investment expenditure essential to maintain the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the works. This involves £24m to stabilize the medium 
term coke supply, £18m for a modem reheating furnace and £20-£25 million 
for various process improvements at the strip mill. The latter expenditure 
would improve the quality and range of output as well as improving the 
efficiency of the production process. Given the recent decision to 
"de bottleneck" Port Talbot, it is unlikely that any of these claims will be 
entertained when the Strip Product Group reviews its operations in 1989. 
As Love and Stevens(7l conclude, there is a strong chance that the strip mill 
will not survive this appraisal and there is a high probability that the plant 
will be closed as soon as substitute capacity is brought on line. This could be 
two to three years ahead. 
If the strip mill closes within this timescale, Ravenscraig's immediate 
major role will be one of supplying high quality slab for internal purposes. 
In the short run there could be considerable volumes despatched to South 
Wales to facilitate the debottlenecking of the two plants with minimum 
disruption. As indicated earlier the demand from the Dalzell plate mill 
seems secure until the mid 1990s. However, as investment increases the 
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capacity of all four integrated plants and some resolution of the plate sector 
is undertaken, these internal markets will decline sharply. 
The annual capacity of Ravenscraig's two concast machines is 
approximately 2.2m tonnes. Assuming a continuing delivery of 500,000 
tonnes of slabs to Dalzell, this implies that by the early 1990's, BS will 
require to market 1.7 million tonnes of slabs externally. In 1987 the UK 
steel industry exported 1.5 million tonnes of semis (ie ingots, blooms, 
billets and slab). At present Ravenscraig slab exports total 350m tonnes pa. 
It is true to say that there is an emerging market for high quality slab but in 
all non-EEC markets the average realized sterling value of semi-finished 
export is low. This is particularly true of North American markets where 
approximately one third of such exports are placed. Fortunately, the dollar, 
whilst volatile, has recently moved favourably against the pound, but future 
access to this market depends on decisions to be taken in 1989 when import 
volumes will be determined for EEC producers. 
Ravenscraig's advantage in export markets derives from its adoption 
of concast and secondary steelmaking and present favourable currency 
levels. Because of scale and locational considerations, it is likely to be 
relatively high cost output. A supply of such products to both US and EEC 
markets would clearly facilitate modernization and rationalization at 
inefficient sites. The most secure arrangement would be similar to the 
medium term contracts proposed and occasionally secured with US 
producers. In the short-term such ventures may prove possible within 
Europe although the difficulties of finding partners free and willing to 
sacrifice capacity to absorb Ravenscraig's slab output should not be 
understated. Thus it is not at all clear that a viable medium term slabmaking 
role exists for the Scottish Plant. 
In addition to the question marks over the commercial attractiveness 
of slab markets, the issue of coke supply needs to be addressed. It is not 
apparent that BS will find it attractive to commit funds to perpetuate a small 
scale facility producing a low value added product. In our view given that 
market considerations do not pre-empt matters, the slab making role will 
not endure past the point when significant investment expenditure becomes 
essential. 
It is apparent that a new role requires to be found to justify 
Ravenscraig beyond the mid 1990's. During the debates and committee 
stage of the British Steel Bill, Dr Jeremy Bray repeatedly drew attention to 
the direction of developments in casting technology. A new generation of 
casting machines is becoming available which generates thin slabs which 
require Jess processing at the rolling stage. Indeed this "thin slab casting" 
process effectively dispenses with the need to operate wide-hot strip mills. 
This new technique is Jess capital intensive and promises significant savings 
in energy consumption per tonne of final product. Adoption significantly 
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reduces the MES of an integrated strip mill and in the US is set to provoke 
competition between the large BOF plants and the Electric Arc minimills in 
strip product markets. 
In addition, the development and adoption of direct smelting over the 
next 20 to 30 years threatens to eclipse the dominance of the BF-BOF 
steelmaking route. This process refines iron ore to steel quality in one 
furnace and promises considerable savings in both capital costs and energy 
consumption. BS is currently constructing a pilot plant in conjunction with 
Dutch steelmaker Hoogovens. If technically and commercially sound, this 
process threatens to provide lower entry costs and yield output competitive 
with that of large scale BF-BOF operations. 
In Europe, such developments could significantly undermine Aylen's 
conclusions concerning the inevitability of growing concentration in 
European steel markets. In this view, 
"It is evident that two minimum efficient scale plants (rather than 
five) would be ideal for supplying all the UK's heavier products 
coupled with, perhaps, two mini-steelworks (there are two at 
present). Comparable restructuring could be anticipated in Western 
Europe, where an obvious solution is for heavy product manufacture 
to gravitate towards a few well chosen coastal sites, with finishing 
facilities- which exhibit fewer economies of scale -located closer to 
mid-European markets. This implies that large swathes of the 
French, Belgian, Luxemburg and West German steel industries 
would close, as coastal sites in Holland, the UK and perhaps France 
and Italy are rounded out to nearer optimum capacity. "(B) 
This view that a small number of very large plants will come to 
dominate European production ignores the possible impact of 
revolutionary process innovations. Another likely long run trend is the 
closure of BF-BOS plants in the face of competition from smaller, better 
located and more flexible producers operating efficient mini mills. 
However, over the coming period the slow trend identified by Aylen is 
likely to dominate. The larger and better situated steelplants will continue 
to be upgraded and enlarged. As outlines above, this process has already 
started in the UK. 
Recent Annual Reports indicate that BS has undertaken considerable 
research into thin slab casting. Love and Stevens<9l have pointed out that BS 
feels under little pressure to adopt this technology quickly because it 
possesses two large scale modern stripmills in South Wales which it can 
upgrade and expand. In the doming period, thin slab casting will become 
mandatory for competitive stripmaking and there is considerable merit in 
Bray's view that BS should install this process at Motherwell in order to 
gain operational experience and to develop the scope of the process. The 
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threat of thin slab casting is imminent. As Bray has argued, 
"Port Talbot and Llanwern may well be the last of the old style hot 
mills in Europe to be modernized. It would not be the first time that 
British Steel has been the last to invest in an obsolescent 
technology. "(to) 
BS does not intend to diversify into non steel activity as many 
American, Japanese and European producers have done. This suggests 
that leading roles in new process innovations are essential if the business is 
to flourish. With expertise in both thin slab casting and direct smelting, BS 
would reduce the risk of being left behind towards the end of the next 
decade and in the first part of the next century. Such advantage will not 
materialise without undertaking the development work now. If this is done, 
BS shareholders can look forward to a competitive business in a strong 
position to engage in multinational expansion both in Europe and further 
afield. 
Thus, a sustained campaign amongst BS's institutional shareholders 
must be undertaken to stress the importance of dynamic efficiency to an 
undiversified steelmaker. The case for the adoption and development of 
thin slab casting at Motherwell could be a major plank in this effort. As 
Bray< 11 l concedes, this technology can only be introduced on that site if the 
strip mill were closed and dismantled. This will present a job loss of over 
700 direct employees plus additional losses through knock on effects. This 
has the advantage of making the remaining 2,500 jobs marginally more 
secure and promises rehires as the new casters and mill come onstream. 
This is progressive argument to put to BS during the strip products review in 
1989 and can be argued alongside retention and investment in the HSM. 
The attractiveness of either option depends on the immediate and 
expected outlook for strip demand. However, installing a new caster will 
remove a bottleneck and could lead to lower average costs at the iron and 
steelmaking stages. The timing of adoption could be left until market 
conditions permit. Thin slab casting affords cost savings which would offset 
the cost penalties inherent in a Scottish inland location. In the mid 1990's, 
Ravenscraig could find itself in the same position as during the early 1980's 
when technical advantage sustained the works in the face of severe 
locational disadvantage. This scenario may be difficult to sell to BS because 
it would ultimately provide capacity over and above that generated by 
removing production constraints in South Wales. 
However, BS is known to be actively seeking European partners 
through either acquisition or joint venture. Any deal could be made 
significantly more attractive if the promise of involvement in new processes 
is part of the package. Thus, the Bray strategy not only makes long run 
sense but could facilitate the company's short run expansionist policy. Such 
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implications should also be drawn to the attention of City institutions who 
are collectively noted for short termism. The pitfalls in this approach should 
not be minimised. BS may be inclined to promote sceptism or could attempt 
to pre-empt the discussions by admitting the general merits of the case and 
by announcing installation of thin slab casting at another site. 
New technology provides a measure of credibility to notions that 
Ravenscraig could survive outwith BS as part of an overseas concern or 
even as an independent entity. The major difficulty with such proposals is 
that they present BS with competition in its UK markets from a UK 
location. It is unlikely that BS will look upon any such prospect favourably, 
in any case, there is no short term liklihood that BS will wish to sell the plant 
because, at present, they foresee a need for it's slab output. However, if the 
capacity issue is resolved in the way outlined by Arthur Young, then there 
may come a time when the works is genuinely surplus to requirements. An 
agreement with Government compels BS to offer the facility for sale at this 
point. It is highly likely that any such offer would be given only at a time of 
difficulty in steel markets. In addition, BS seem set to operate Ravenscraig 
with minimal investment expenditure thus reducing the attractiveness of 
the plant to potential buyers. Thin slab casting would offer future owners a 
low cost route into strip markets from a relatively high cost location. 
However finishing mills would be required to further process the strip for 
final customers. An independent Scottish operator would either have to 
construct these at suitable sites or link up with continental facilities. The 
former presents substantial capital costs above the purchase price and any 
sums required to modernize the capacity. The latter raises the question of 
whether partners could be found willing to close domestic steelmaking 
capacity in order to absorb Scottish output. Such an arrangement is not 
impossible to contemplate but does involve considerable suspension of 
judgement. 
Although thin slab casting offers some hope of a future for 
Ravenscraig outwith British Steel, there are risks that it will not be a 
commercially sound step for anyone at a time when BS were prepared to 
part with the capacity. It would be less risky for Scottish interests if BS were 
persuaded to undertake this investment. They would be better placed to 
market the product and have knowledge of both the works and the new 
casting process. It should be appreciated that such an option would merely 
prolong the life of the existing iron and steelmaking operation and thus 
extend the timescale available in which to plan and execute policies to 
minimize the social and economic effects of steel retreat from North 
Lanarkshire. However there is nothing to be lost in a strategy which seeks 
to buy time. 
Conclusion 
Two scenarios concerning the future industrial structure of the steel 
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industry have been presented in this paper. The first, that of Aylen and BS 
itself, sees the emergence of a smaller number of large, well laid out and 
situated plants supplying a progressively declining demand for bulk steel 
products. The second, that of Love & Stevens and Bray, sees new 
technology affording the possibility of entry by smaller, competitive 
suppliers threatening the markets and scale economies required by the 
large BOS-BOF plants. It should be appreciated that it is difficult to 
advance Scotland as an optimal location in either case. 
The existence of an option which affords BS the opportunity of 
increasing profitability and maintaining volume via locational withdrawal is 
one which will be exercised sooner or later. 
Privatisation significantly increases the probability of early 
implementation. Indeed, there is strong evidence that this course is 
currently being pursued and that BS management will shortly commend 
further stages to the new owners. This involves depressed earnings in the 
short run because of exceptional items such as redundancy costs and site 
closure costs. The benefit is a future stream of higher profits and thus a 
stronger equity price. To smooth out the impact on profits a phased 
withdrawal from Motherwell is likely in the manner set out by Arthur 
Young. The bulk of the total costs will fall on the community whose 
institutions will require to commit substantial resources towards repairing 
the social and economic damage which will inevitably result. 
Baur(IZ) has argued persuasively that Ravenscraig assumes a 
significance in Scottish public affairs not justified by its role and status in the 
Scottish economy. This is certainly correct. However there are three recent 
studies of the economic impact of closure. Arthur Young<13l and Bell et 
al< 14l estimate that 11-12,000 jobs will ultimately be lost whilst Pieda(1
5
l 
forecasts a loss of9,550 jobs and a reduction in Scottish GDP of £100m pa. 
Part of the discrepancy in estimates is accounted for by the exclusion of 
Dalzell in the latter analysis. All three reports are unanimous that the vast 
bulk of the impact would fall on the Lanarkshire economy. Baur advances 
the view that the Scottish Office believe that an orderly provision of 
alternative employment can be organized following a gradual withdrawal 
from steelmaking activity. Indeed this stance has been taken by Ministers in 
the face of several recent closure announcements, notably that at the Royal 
Ordnance Factory (ROF) at Bishopton. There has also been much 
Ministerial reference to 'success' in other steel closure areas with the 
experience of the Garnock Valley to the fore in such accounts. 
These arguments should be approached with extreme caution. The 
loss of large numbers of relatively well paid manual and semi-skilled jobs in 
the traditional industries in the 1970's and 1980's has left its toll in Central 
Scotland. In the Garnock Valley, a small business development 
programme was initiated in 1979 following the closure of the majority of 
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Glengarnock Steelworks. Significant environmental work and provision of 
advance factories were undertaken to facilitate the creation of small and 
medium size industrial concerns. It is true to say that a significant number of 
jobs have been assisted but many employ a predominantly female 
workforce and most are characterized by low skill profiles and poor wage 
rates. This experience is mirrored across the Central Belt where many of 
the old industrial communities afford the choice of either no work or work 
in marginal employment at low wages. 
Although a proper evaluation of the labour market experience of 
Glengarnock's steelworkers has not been undertaken, it is true to say that 
few ended up in the new enterprises set up in the Garnock Valley. However 
their offspring have and can be viewed to be stuck in a low skill-low wage 
trap. The main community concerned, Kilbirnie, lost both coherence and 
morale and is only now slowly recovering. Significant deprivation exists 
which will get worse as the pension income of former industrial employees 
declines. Indeed, there are few of the new jobs with adequate pension 
schemes or prospects for advancement. The Garnock Valley lost an 
opportunity structure which held out some prospects for economic 
advancement from a low human capital base and this has not been replaced. 
This is the picture which exists across Central Scotland in the face of the 
decline of core industries. 
The state of industrial policy in Scotland is such that, on the back of 
growing skill shortages, the Scottish CBI have negotiated a new approach 
directly with the Prine Minister. The experience of the past decade should 
persuade one that a small business policy will create a high proportion of 
marginal jobs at low wages. The bulk of the returns appear to accrue to the 
entrepreneurs, especially in Scotland where high unemployment constrains 
the ability of labour to pre-empt a larger share of any rents which result 
from the firms activity. A complementary training initiative is likely to 
confer benefits on the labourforce itself. It would go some way to providing 
an equitable solution for those disadvantaged because they happened to 
come onto the labour market in the early 1980's. Indeed the experience of 
recent schoolleavers is not markedly better. To day, the vast majority of 
Scots displaced from traditional industry and their children, who have been 
largely brought up to follow suit, have been unable to share in the benefits 
offered by the Enterprize Culture. It is to be hoped that the 'Hughes Plan' 
leads to opportunities for the unemployed in peripheral estates and 
depressed communities and those in marginal employment to acquire 
marketable skills on which to base careers and plan futures. 
Whatever the outcome of these deliberations, if arguments based on 
new technology fail to impress British Steel, then urgent consideration 
must be given to major economic initiatives in North Lanarkshire. Indeed, 
it is arguable that greater resources should be concentrated in this area in 
any case because it is part of the economy with manifest difficulties. 
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Ancilliary measures such as the upgrading of the A 74 and the provision of 
fast rail links between the North and the Channel Tunnel would clearly 
enhance the attractiveness of the area for industrial and commercial 
development. In addition, further civil service dispersal is being sought and 
Lanarkshire should be considered for such projects. The notion that new 
SDA initiatives in North Lanarkshire undermine and betray the steel 
industry is palpable nonsense. Following privatisation, decisions on steel 
are wholly independent of the economic and social conditions in the area. 
Lanarkshire has nothing to lose from demanding greater resources and 
those who criticize such measures are flying in the face tof common sense. 
Any offers of major expenditure should be universally applauded rather 
than treated with suspicion. 
However, such initiatives should not be represented in any attempt to 
understate the severe and painful adjustments which would result as a 
consequence of steel closure. New economic activity would result in a 
pattern of labour demand markedly different from that which prevails in 
the steel industry and those closely linked sectors which would contract in 
tandem. Thus, even if there were tangible evidence of major and properly 
resourced business development and training programmes in Scotland, it 
would be imprudent to give up 11,000 jobs in an already depressed 
economy without first exhausting every commercial possibility for their 
retention. 
Jim Love, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde. 
Jim Stevens, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde. 
References 
1. Aylen, Jonathon, "The Privatization of the British Steel 
Corporation", Fiscal Studies, Vol.9, No.3, August 1988. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Young, Arthur, "A Study of the Impact of Privatization of British 
Steel Corporation on the Future of Ravenscraig and Dalzell Steel 
Works", Motherwell District Council, February 1988. 
5. Bell, D, Findlay, J, Oughton, C, "The Importance of the Steel 
Industry to the Scottish Economy", Scottish Steel Campaign Trust, 
March 1988. 
6. STUC, "Privatization and the Scottish Steel Industry", STUC, 
September 1987. 
68 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1989 
7. Love, J and Stevens, J. "RSD: A Comment", Fraser of Allander 
Institute Quarterly Economic Commentary, Vol.13, No.4, June 
1988. 
8. Aylen, op.cit. p.15. 
9. Love and Stevens, op. cit. 
10. Bray, J. "The City should make sure British Steel's strengths are built 
on", Financial Times, 19th October 1988. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Baur, C. "Long Shadow Hangs Over Ravenscraig", Scotland on 
Sunday, 16th October 1988. 
13. Young, op. cit. 
14. Bell eta!, op. cit. 
15. PIED A, "BSC Ravenscraig Works: Economic Impacts of Closure", 
Scottish Television Ltd, December 1987. 
69 
